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In the late 19th century, the strategy of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was based on the radical ''Jeune Ecole'' naval philosophy, as promoted by French military advisor and naval architect Emile Bertin. This emphasized cheap torpedo boats and commerce raiding to offset expensive, heavily armoured ships. The acquisition of two German-built s by the Imperial Chinese Beiyang Fleet in 1885 threatened Japan's interests in Korea. A visit by the Chinese warships to Japan in early 1891 forced the Japanese government to acknowledge that the IJN required similarly armed and armoured ships of its own to counter the ironclads; the three lightly armored s ordered from France would not suffice, despite their powerful guns. The IJN decided to order a pair of the latest battleships from the United Kingdom〔Evans & Peattie, pp. 15, 19–20, 60〕 as Japan lacked the technology and capability to construct its own battleships.〔Brook 1999, p. 123〕 Combat experience in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 convinced the IJN that the ''Jeune Ecole'' doctrine was untenable. Therefore, Japan promulgated a ten-year naval build-up in early 1896, to modernize and expand its fleet in preparation for further conflicts, with the construction of a total of six battleships and six armored cruisers at its core.〔Evans & Peattie, pp. 15, 57–60〕 These ships were provided for from the £30,000,000 indemnity paid by China after losing the First Sino-Japanese War and the four remaining battleships of the program were also built in the UK.〔Brook 1999, p. 125〕 Rising tensions between the Japanese and the Russian Empire over control of Korea and Manchuria in the early 1900s caused the former to begin the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 with a surprise attack on the Russian base at Port Arthur. The Imperial Japanese Army captured the port, and the surviving ships of the Pacific Squadron by the end of the year, but the Russians had dispatched the bulk of their Baltic Fleet to relieve Port Arthur before then. It did not reach the Korea Strait until May 1905 and was virtually annihilated by the IJN in the Battle of Tsushima despite significantly outnumbering the Japanese. During the war, Japan captured a total of six Russian pre-dreadnoughts. These were all repaired and commissioned into the Japanese fleet; of these, three were later returned to Russia during World War I, as the two countries were by then allies. The magnitude of the victory at Tsushima caused the leadership of the IJN to believe that a surface engagement between the main fleets was the only decisive battle in modern warfare and would be decided by battleships armed with the largest guns. The corollary to this was that Japanese ships had to be qualitatively superior to those of their opponents to ensure victory.〔Evans & Peattie, pp. 85–86, 110, 116–32〕 After the war, the Japanese Empire immediately turned its focus to the two remaining rivals for imperial dominance in the Pacific Ocean: Britain and the United States.〔Stille, p. 4〕 Satō Tetsutarō, an IJN admiral and military theorist, speculated that conflict would inevitably arise between Japan and at least one of its two main rivals. To that end, he called for the IJN to maintain a fleet with at least 70% as many capital ships as the US Navy. This ratio, Satō theorized, would enable the Imperial Japanese Navy to defeat the US Navy in one major battle in Japanese waters in any eventual conflict. Accordingly, the 1907 Imperial Defense Policy called for the construction of a battle fleet of eight modern battleships, each, and eight modern armored cruisers, each.〔Evans & Peattie, pp. 143, 150〕 This was the genesis of the Eight-Eight Fleet Program, the development of a cohesive battle line of sixteen capital ships.〔Stille, p. 7〕 The launch of in 1906 by the Royal Navy raised the stakes,〔Evans & Peattie, p. 152〕 and complicated Japan's plans as she rendered all existing battleships obsolete.〔Sandler, p. 90〕 The launch of the battlecruiser the following year was a further setback for Japan's quest for parity.〔Evans & Peattie, p. 154〕 When the two new s and two armored cruisers, launched by 1911, were outclassed by their British counterparts, the Eight-Eight Fleet Program was restarted.〔Evans & Peattie, p. 159〕 The first battleships built for the renewed Eight-Eight Fleet Program were the two dreadnoughts of the , ordered in 1907 and laid down in 1908. In 1910, the Navy put forward a request to the Diet (parliament) to secure funding for the entirety of the program at once. Because of economic constraints, the proposal was cut first by the Navy Ministry to seven battleships and three battlecruisers, then by the cabinet to four armored cruisers and a single battleship. The Diet amended this by authorizing the construction of four battlecruisers (the ) and one battleship, later named ''Fusō'', in what became the Naval Emergency Expansion bill.〔Evans & Peattie, p. 160〕 ==Pre-Dreadnoughts== 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「List of battleships of Japan」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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